Operation Giant Slingshot: A History (Part 4)

On 22 May GSS units began conducting coordinated land / waterborne ambushes. These were later dubbed Bushwack ops. The waterborne ambush had been highly successful but the sophistication of the tactic added two things to it. First it was variance to counter any advance made by the VC toward combating the WBA and secondly it increased the possibility of contact or kill in case of contact. Bushwack ops employed a platoon of U.S. Army troops, preferably recon troops, Rangers or raiders, use to fighting in small units. The platoon was split in two groups and embarked on two boats. Upon insertion of the boats in ambush the platoon would deploy inland approximately 200 meters. It can be readily seen why the WBA was enhanced by this new twist. The troops extended the "Possibility of Contact" envelope. They provided advance warning of approaching VC. The troops preferred this type of ambush because they had mobility, greater secrecy of insertion, .50 caliber machine gun support and an instantaneous extraction vehicle should it be necessary. This Navy-Army team got plenty of solid contact and kills, and is responsible for breaking up of VC movements, disruption of commo-liaison routes in the accomplishment of the interdiction mission.

June can only be described as a month of maneuvers and counter-maneuvers. The entire month is laced with tricky maneuvers by the VC and equally tricky moves by the GIANT SLINGSHOT forces. These maneuvers were by no means confined to this month but they were in high evidence in June.

On the 31st of May and again on the 3rd of June, hawsers were discovered in an area upriver from Tra Cu. The first was discovered as a result of a Hoi Chanh rallier disclosing the fact that the span was used to raft supplies across the river and possibly high-line. The second hawser was entangled in the screws of a transiting LCM-8 on 3 June. This tricky maneuver had many possibilities and was difficult to detect either in use or when stowed. Sweep gear was streamed by RAG units after the incidents and lead to the discovery of two more hawsers all within the same general area. Extreme tidal conditions in the area and increased attention to crossing gave rise to increased cache discoveries during June. However, the total monthly tonnage of 4.5 tons was well below the average of approximately 15 tons per month.

On 5 June, Operation Barrier Reef East was discontinued. The stretch of assets along the Great Barrier was continuing and GSS felt it's first pinch for assets when River patrol Division 571 moved from the Barrier Reef East canals to the upper Saigon River to form a new interdiction group. Random patrols were made on the canals by the Tuyen Nhon based boats with the intent of maintaining a presence in the AO.

June saw the SEAL platoon, which had been staged in Ben Luc permanently in May, conduct valuable intel gathering missions at all points up and down the Vam Co Dong.

The U.S. Army Air Cushioned Vehicles assigned to the 3rd/Bde of the 9th U.S. Inf Div staged out of NSA Ben Luc and conducted joint ops in and around the Ben Luc, Tan An, Thu Thua areas and up the Bo Bo Canal, long know to be a major VC infiltration route.

On 13 June, the Vietnamese RAIDS completed their training and indoctrination and were given full responsibility for the area of the rivers from the confluence to Tan An (RAID-70) and to Ben Luc (RAID-71) respectively. While combined operations continued to be conducted in this and other tactical areas of responsibility, these areas were under the complete command of RAID commanders now assigned as Task Unit commanders. The performance of these two RAID's in Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT has been exemplary. They performed every mission assigned and were quick to correct any mistakes made. LCDR Tieu, VNN, was placed in charge of both RAID's and provided the driving force needed for combined operations and conduct them in a coordinated manner.

Just as a plan to expand the operation in the Can Giouc area was being completed, a sudden surge of enemy activity dictated it be held in abeyance. GIANT SLINGSHOT had been ordered to support the 3rd/bde of the 9th Inf Div in the area of Can Giouc District of Long An Province. In order to fulfill this task, CDR Arie C. A. Sigmond USN, who had relieved CDR Murphy on 13 May, and who assumed CTG 194.9, decided to relocate some of his assets in order to allow RivDiv 573 to move into the Can Giouc area to directly support the 6th/31st Battalion and conduct interdiction operations. This maneuver was postponed and later dropped because of increased activity in the Go Dau Ha, Ben Keo, Tay Ninh City area.

On 9 June, the Tay Ninh operation was expanded from the north-south WT 19 grid line crossing the Vam Co Dong to within one kilometer of the Cambodian Border. Ten PBRs and five RAC had been positioned at the hastily formed ATSB at Ben Keo, due south of Tay Ninh City. This addition was welcomed by the Commanding General of the 25th U.S. Inf Div because of the increasing activity in and around Tay Ninh City. The General appreciated the Navy's presence in interdicting the waterways, as the activity in the area took a sharp rise between 17-21 June. Five and six firefights were the average precluding any shifting or spreading thinner of US assets. On 20 June, HA(L)-3-Det-7 was stationed in Tay Ninh West to provide quick reaction air support to the forces in Ben Keo and Go Dau Ha. Det-3 had by then been moved from Moc Hoa to YRBM-20 on the Mekong River at An Long to better protect the Barrier Reef West units.

The newly formed RAIDs 73, 74, and 75 steamed out of Saigon on the day of commissioning and around GIANT SLINGSHOT rivers for a "show of force" throughout the delta. The RAIDs sailed up the Vam Co Dong to Ben Keo then back to the confluence of the Van Co Tay. RAID 73 dropped out of the "show" at Tuyen Nhon and was chopped to CTG 194.9 opcon at the end of June.

In July, the U.S. Navy teamed with the U.S. Army and was credited with saving Tay Ninh City from the Viet Cong. Intel predicted that the VC were planning to attack Tay Ninh City and occupy it long enough to establish a provisional government. They anticipated that all nations of the world, tired of the Vietnam conflict, would rush to recognize the provisional government with it's capital in Tay Ninh City (the third largest city in South Vietnam). Thus, one of the key battles of the war was approaching and the U.S. was determined to deny the enemy Tay Ninh. The 25th Inf Div dug in for the attack and on 6 July COMNAVFORV executed a contingency plan already established to concentrate the forces in the Tay Ninh area to protect the city. This operation was named Operation Double Shift. It called for 48 hour notice to relocate assets from other parts of the delta in order to triple the GIANT SLINGSHOT force in Go Dau Ha and Ben Keo. The units were only given four hours notice and all units were on station within 24 hours after receiving their orders. Two River Patrol Divisions 574 and 513 sailed from Binh Thuy to Go Dau Ha and two other River Patrol Divisions, 532 and 531, sailed to Tay Ninh City (Ben Keo) from My Tho. River Assault Division 151 was sent to Ben Keo and RAID 71 sailed to Go Dau Ha. Each location thus had thirty PBRs and approximately twenty RAC. The excellently executed plan had results as evidence by continuous heavy contact with large sized VC forces trying to cross the Vam Co Dong and swinging around southwest of Tay Ninh City to attack. Continuous 24-hour patrols were maintained with the greatest percentage of the boats operating at night. Each PBR Division was given one third of the Task Unit's AO in which to operate. The RAC were spread over the entire area. This heavy concentration of boats virtually precluded any large crossing of forces. This coupled with larger numbers of WBAs in unknown areas (to VC), disputed the VC movements at time when a coordinated attack was critical. On the nights of 13 to 16 July the GIANT SLINGSHOT units made contact 12, 8, 11, and 7 times respectively. On the night of July 13-14 the Ben Keo units stopped a large crossing of approximately fifty enemy in coordination with arty, air strikes, fire from the boats and various Army elements. When contact was broken on the morning of 14 July a cumulative total of 50 VC had been killed.

On 22, 23, and 24 July, Operation Double Shift was successively down graded to the normal number of assets. A major portion of the credit was given to the Navy for having played a key and vital part in the defense. The actual battles were deceptive to the untrained eye and went virtually unnoticed by the news media. The self satisfaction of all GIANT SLINGSHOT forces in having done a rapid, efficient , military and valuable job was payment enough. Once again GIANT SLINGSHOT has responded to the task at hand and did so without hesitation. Not only without hesitation, but with thoroughness that assured complete success, a tribute to those who fought so gallantry.

RAID 71 had been relieved after one week by RAID 70 in order to allow both units to participate in the battle. Both handled themselves in a professional manner. Both became a true element of the interdiction force and established their reputation through hard work and dedication to the interdiction goal.

On 26 July one departing River Patrol Division was diverted to remain in Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT to work with the Vietnamese RAID units south of Ben Luc. The VC concentrations had built up in the area and the additional PBR craft gave the versatility needed to ambush and interdict any attempted crossings. On 4 August this RivDiv departed. During the tour, numerous ambushes were set successfully. The posture of the war took on a new look - one being defensive in nature and the term ambush was renamed (Waterborne Guard Post).

On 5 August four PBRs were relocated from Tan An to recommence patrols on the Barrier Reef East Canals. The PBR's were deemed most effective, because the canals were too narrow for the heavies to maneuver with ease. The four PBRs were assigned from Tan An and Moc Hoa on successive months to divide the load and still maintain state of maintenance and readiness.

On 13 August the units again shifted to Go Dau Ha and Ben Keo. The U.S. and VN RAC never left the area, and only one additional PBR Division was sent to each ATSB. This double shift had been ordered on indicators of a second buildup of enemy forces which were aborted, largely due to the Navy presence on the river. The units stood down on 27 August and returned to normal operations, RAID 73 left GIANT SLINGSHOT at this time to re-deploy elsewhere in the delta.

On 24 August another portion of the MRF completed turn-over to the GVN and TASK FORCE 117 was disbanded. Unassigned RAC remaining in U.S. possession (two river assault squadrons) were assigned to CTG 194.7 to act as the Sealords Mobile Assault and Interdiction Unit. Captain Blair USN, was appointed CTG 194.7 and embarked on his flagship, which was anchored on the Vam Co River, to support U.S. Army forces in southwestern Long An Province. He also assumed responsibility for patrolling the Vam Co River and interdicting enemy movement there. This task had been performed by various units including swift boats (PCF's), PBR's and RAC since late February.

At approximately the same time TF 117 was disbanded, TF 116 also lost its importance. PBRs no longer patrolled the rivers of the Mekong Delta performing the population and resources control mission. The River Patrol Divisions Force was put in abeyance. As a result of this decision, all River Patrol Divisions assigned to GIANT SLINGSHOT were frozen in their assignments. Previously the RivDivs had rotated to other operations after approximately two months in GIANT SLINGSHOT. This change was applauded by most adding stability to both the operation and homeport of assigned RivDivs.

The month of September was a period of normal operations. Enemy activity in and around each ATSB, and throughout each TAOR, as evidenced by four or five nightly contacts, continued.

The Navy and ground forces had disrupted organized and NVA reinforced VC Battalions. After the last double shift, the boats (especially those from Go Dau Ha) sailed the rivers at night making noise to draw fire from the enemy and lure him into defeat. This had a psychological effect upon the VC and their plans. They continued to cross the river, but only because of necessity and then in all small numbers. This near swaggering by the Navy had given them command of the situation and plaudits from every Army General and trooper in the area. The mettle of these forces had been tested and tempered to a fine edge. These forces are the best in Vietnam or anywhere else.

October was the month of concerted Vietnamzation in GIANT SLINGSHOT and in the Delta. LCDR TIEU was made the Deputy Commander Task Group 194.9. This put him second in command of the entire operation giving him further insight into the inner workings and mechanisms of the Task Group Commanders' job.

October was also the month that the PBR's were turned over to the Vietnamese and sent to GIANT SLINGSHOT. Other PBRs had been turned over earlier but none had arrived into the operation. River Patrol Group 53 was commissioned on 10 October and after completing an around the Delta cruise with three other RPG's it arrived at Ben Luc to begin training and operating. The Vietnamese RPG is the size of two U.S. PBR Divisions (20 boats). RPG 53 had participated in the ACTOV (Accelerated Turnover) Program and upon commissioning had a core of PBR trained crewmen. After two weeks of training and familiarization RPG began operating north of Ben Luc to the Horseshoe region of the Vam Co Dong (10 boats) and north of Tan An to the north south XS 38 grid line (10 boats). Like their fellow shipmates in the RAIDs, they had displayed an eagerness to learn and spirited aggressiveness while operating.

October was building month for the U.S. navy. Constant improvement was continued on the physical plant at each base.

A battalion of Vietnamese Marines Corps was assigned to CDR Sigmond and conducted mobile amphibious operations between the confluence and Tra Cu on the Vam Co Dong. Although not making any big contacts the training received and coordination effected, gained for them, assignment to their own Area of Operations north of Ben Luc in the Pineapple fields region of Upper Long An Province.

In early November CAPT BLAIR and his task group redeployed to Dong Tam to further assist the VNN in their assumption of the war effort. The AO vacated by CTG 194.7 was assumed by CTG 194.9. Part of River Division Assault Division 151 and its CO were assigned to support the 6th/31st Btn of the 9th Inf Div in Can Giouc District. The GIANT SLINGSHOT AO now covers Long An Province, Hau Nghia Province and the lower part of the Tay Ninh Province.

The Task Unit Commander of the Can Giouc TAOR was based aboard the USS SPHINX (ARL-24) along with the RAC boats there for repairs.

Later in the month units reacted to information received from a Hoi Chanh (a VC who had rallied to the GVN) about a cache of 20 U.S. Springfield rifles, 16 Chicom carbines, 1 B-40 Rocket Launcher and various mines and grenades. This cache is just part of the 2.7 tons of weapons caches captured in GSS during the month of November. This brings the total to 136.3 tons uncovered since the operation was started in December 1968.

On the night 23 November, while units at Ben Keo were chain dragging, one phase of base defense in continuing effort to detect mining attempts before sappers got in close proximity to boats at the base, a minesweeper caught a "submerged ¾" wire stretching across the river. This was destroyed as it may have been a method of moving people or contraband across the river by pulling it taut at night, similar to the Hoi Chanh report of May and June.

During the week leading up to the annual Army-Navy game, the various Army and Navy units in GIANT SLINGSHOT dropped "Beat Army" and "Beat Navy" leaflets on the opposing members bases - all in good traditional spirits. However, no mention will be made of the outcome of the game

28 November marked another stepping stone in the growing process at Ben Luc. The new NOC became operational. All gear was moved off YR-9 in preparation for the ship's transfer to Nha Be. Those who had been on the staff when the YR-9 sailed upriver to Ben Luc had now seen the end of another era but were glad to move in the new operations center, which far surpassed the old NOC in all respects.

December was here and final preparations were being finished for the first Anniversary Ceremony to be held 5 December 1969 marking the end of a most successful year in all respects.

Aside from approximately 30 guests of honor, River Divisions were represented to receive U.S. and/or Vietnamese awards. Following the personnel inspection, awards ceremony, and speeches, the VNN hosted an outdoor luncheon followed by a floor show. The entire ceremony was well received by all.

During the past several weeks, activity had been at a minimum with FRIFF's outnumbering ENIFF's.

It is interesting to note that the rainy season was over and the water level was beginning to recede. This influences the enemy's ability to travel via the waterways, possibly leading to an increase of movement before the level goes much lower.

After coordinating with the U.S. Army and National Maritime Police, a new concept of interdiction on the rivers was developed. This concept was the mobile traffic checkpoints, employing U.S. or VN boats, a squad of soldiers as perimeter defense, and National Maritime Police to search thoroughly each and every sampan that passes the checkpoint. The logic behind employing the police is to establish their authority on the river. The results have been very promising and effective.

During the short time it takes to check the sampans, the medical civic action and dental civic action personnel were present to give aid to any person requiring it, as well as the psyops team passing out such items as soap, toothbrushes and leaflets. Towards the end of the 1st week in December, there were definite indications that the enemy was attempting to infiltrate from Cambodia south towards staging areas in South Vietnam. To counter the threat, the PBR's of RivDiv 573 at Tuyen Nhon were redeployed to the western Barrier Reef area, near Chou Doc, under the control of CTG 194.4 who was made responsible for the entire barrier. This still left 10 ASPB's and one 105mm Monitor to patrol the Tuyen Nhon area on the Vam Co Tay.

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